Between Solidarity and the Priority to Protect – Where Refugee Relocation meets Refugee Resettlement

As resettlement in Europe continues to evolve, its effectiveness in responding to humanitarian emergencies and long term refugee situations beyond EU territory has been challenged by difficulties which are related to how EU Member States answer the question – What does the resettlement of refugees consist of?

Solidarity of Member States with third states is perhaps best demonstrated through resettlement while relocation is an example of internal Member State solidarity. There is a need to define both of these terms. It has been made clear by the Commission in its Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the establishment of a joint EU resettlement programme (page 3) that, unlike resettlement which is considered a humanitarian enterprise concerned with solidarity with third countries, relocation is a ‘burden sharing’ exercise, at the heart of which is solidarity between EU Member States north and south.

The Know Reset project has considered how this defined difference does not prevent Member States from allowing overlap between these two distinct undertakings. The importance of access to protection for refugees prompted the EU to begin to explore more feasible methods by which refugees may be taken by Member States and given protection. These refugees did not therefore have to gain access to Union territory. This resettlement was widely regarded as being in solidarity with the European neighbourhood – especially non-Member States to the south.

As resettlement evolved the idea of this external solidarity became somewhat confused by expressions of internal solidarity. Those persons who gained access to Member State territory through ‘irregular’ means and later became refugees have, in certain circumstances, been relocated to other Member States. Most of these clandestine arrivals have been to Mediterranean Member States who have found themselves under intense strain from such migration. As an act of solidarity, Member States have taken refugees from their fellow Member State.

The following is a table of those EU Member States which have relocated under the EUREMA programme in Malta according to the EASO report on that programme. This relocation programme is an intra-European initiative which takes internationally protected individuals from one Member State and finds another Member State willing to accept these individuals.

*Denotes Member States which have committed to relocate refugees as part of the EUREMA programme but have yet to do so.

Relocation from Malta is on-going and uptake in participation has increased. The word which arises time and time again among the States which participate is solidarity. The States which participate are, more often than not, northern EU Member States. They are not on the receiving end of the heavy migration flows which reach the southern, Mediterranean Member States. On that basis, relocation from the Mediterranean to their own State is seen as an act of solidarity.

The tension arises through certain Member States, typically those which are most experienced in resettlement, calling into question whether relocation comes at the expense of resettlement. Resettlement undoubtedly remains the preferable response to those most in need. The priority to protect those who have not been able to gain access to European territory should remain the primary objective in the view of certain Member States.

Malta, the home of the EASO, has been the venue of the aforementioned EU relocation pilot project – EUREMA. An emerging role of the EASO is in evaluating the relocation pilot project as can be seen from the EASO’s September newsletter.

It has become clear that there may be a risk of using relocation as a substitute for resettlement. This is a misperception that the EU, Member States and the EASO must be mindful of in participating in refugee relocation in Europe. The friction between relocation and resettlement indeed points to the greater challenges in achieving a functioning and effective solidarity within the Common European Asylum System.

In July of 2012, the EASO released a fact finding report on intra-EU relocation activities from Malta. Respondents to the report expressed “mixed” views on relocation:

“While a number of participating States maintained that voluntary ad hoc relocation measures with Malta were a concrete tool for demonstrating intra-EU solidarity, and generally assessed them positively, other States feared that …relocation …could act as a pull factor for irregular migration…”

“…concerns were expressed about the possible implication of relocation on the resettlement quotas in the EU. It was stressed that intra-EU relocation should not be confused with resettlement of refugees from third countries.”

The EASO here underline what must be a pivotal consideration if the resettlement of refugees in Europe is to increase quantitatively and qualitatively. As part of our research we have recorded reaction to relocation across the twenty-seven EU Member States. Interesting perspectives on the advantages and disadvantages of relocation have been gathered and provide an insight into State behaviour.

Differing attitudes were identified among Member States toward relocation – some advocate for it, certain States are opposed to it and still others seem not to differentiate completely between relocation and resettlement.

Of those States which express doubt as to the use of relocation, a Swedish opinion on the matter was expressed in an interview by Know Reset with a political adviser to the Swedish Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy.[1] That adviser stated that Sweden is doubtful as to the use of relocation; it was stated that the places used for relocation should instead be used for resettlement from outside the EU. The interviewee went on to state that there were alternative measures of solidarity which could be pursued if Member States wanted to express their solidarity. Finland is of a similar disposition to their Scandinavian neighbours. Finland and Sweden represent two traditional resettlement countries. Both States have well established and large resettlement on a programme basis. Another interesting emerging viewpoint from our research in Scandinavia is that the Member States to the north often do not accept that reducing the pressure on its southern counterparts should be a legitimate aim. This sentiment should be considered in the context of the northern Member States believing that they already take a considerable share of the so-called ‘burden’ of refugee numbers. This is interesting when it is considered how often intra-EU solidarity is proffered by certain Member States as a reason for pursuing relocation.

Slovakia does not conduct resettlement but has announced that it intends to participate in relocation. Hungary is in a similar position. Lithuania committed in 2011 to relocate from Malta but that declaration has yet to be implemented. A trend for certain States is emerging that if they do not participate in resettlement, they may instead be involved in relocation. The overwhelming reason given for this is that of solidarity with EU partners to the south. If those countries were not involved in relocation, would they be resettling refugees? This question is impossible to answer definitively however a tendency has emerged for newer Member States, which are oftentimes new to refugee resettlement as well, to primarily pursue relocation as an avenue of EU solidarity in terms of refugee intake.

Finally, there also exists a grey area in between preferences for resettlement and preferences for relocation. Ireland and France typify this intermediary position. Refugees whom arrive to the State as part of a relocation regime may be included in the quota of that State for refugee resettlement. The need to differentiate between relocation and resettlement is particularly salient in this context.

The overwhelming message to be gleaned is that the relocation of refugees within Europe must not come at the expense of resettlement. Resettlement, the humanitarian enterprise, underlines the priority to protect. Taking refugees from third States beyond the Union which are host to much larger numbers of refugees is taking the most vulnerable and giving them an opportunity that they otherwise will not receive. Protection must be the priority and as difficult as conditions are within certain Member States for refugees, if they are at least properly protected then it is still a fortunate situation in comparison to the precarious position of many refugees in camps across the world.

The EASO can play a role in ensuring that relocation is not carried out at the expense of granting resettlement to those refugees who are eligible for resettlement and who are still at risk and should be a protection priority. National authorities should also be aware of the distinction and the importance of not putting protection priorities behind the commendable desire to express solidarity with other Member States. This balance must always be at the forefront of any consideration of relocation.

This article is based on the results of the research led within the framework of the KNOW RESET project.

Frank Mc Namara, Research Assistant to Know Reset.

The views expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of the Migration Policy Centre.

A Call for Reform, Expediency and Transparency : MPC’s Response to European Commission’s consultation on non-EU researchers and students

The European Union (EU) still has a long way to go before it is able to make itself the most attractive destination for non-EU researchers and students. This simple conclusion has emerged clearly in the Migration Policy Centre’s (MPC’s) recent response[1] to the European Commission’s open consultation on “The future rules on the entry and residence of non-EU national researchers, students, school pupils, unremunerated trainees and volunteers in the EU”[2].

Introduction

One may ask, what is the importance of this consultation? Migration policy, including procedures on visas and residence permits, plays an important role in enabling the access of non-EU students and researchers into the EU. They are also crucial for defining the rights of non-EU nationals and ensure their fair treatment once they reside in the EU. To have a transparent and straightforward migration policy is also important for the EU as it wishes to become the main destination for non-EU researchers and students.

With these objectives in mind, the European Commission conducted the above consultation to evaluate the existing directives governing the entry and residence of third-country nationals (TCNs) students and researchers. The directives in question are – Directive 2004/114[3](the so-called “Students Directive”) and Directive 2005/71 [4](also known as the “Researchers Directive”). These directives affect approximately 81,515 non-EU students[5] and, furthermore, influence the EU’s external migration policy and its dialogue and cooperation with third countries in this area, defined by the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility[6](GAMM).

MPC´s response to the consultation has highlighted some of the main shortcomings in the current EU Directives, in particular focusing on the four issues discussed below:

• Setting a time limit for a Member State to evaluate visa/residence permit applications from TCN researchers or students;
• Transparency and accountability
• Access to labour market (both during and after period(s) of study/research)
• Intra-EU mobility of TCN researchers and students.

Time limit for processing applications

 Firstly, with regards to the visa processing time, the MPC believes that there should be a precise binding time limit for deciding on applications. Currently,  Article 15.1 of the “Researchers Directive” and Article 18.1 of the “Students Directive” are too general and need to be modified. In comparison with the three months deadline for EU Blue Card[7] for highly skilled workers, a maximum duration of one month could be considered appropriate and made binding on Member States for processing applications and delivering the long-term visa (or the residence permit if this is done abroad).

Furthermore, to facilitating visa and residence permit applications, the Commission and Member States should take more care of making information available about the existence of rules facilitating the admission of researchers and students in the EU. A worldwide campaign towards third-country research organisations, universities and ministries involving the embassies and consulates of Member States could be envisaged.

Transparency and accountability

A major concern that has been brought to the forefront by the MPC response is the issue is the discussion of transparency and accountability in the visa processing stage. The MPC believes that Article 14 of the “Researchers Directive” and Article 18 of the “Students Directive” should be modified to oblige immigration authorities to notify their reasons in case they refuse an application. This would further enhance the transparency in the process and boost a credible image of the issuing authorities.

In addition, it must be stressed that infringement procedures should be launched without any further delay against Member States applying different rules than the directives for the delivery of visas or a two steps procedure (one for the admission and one for the delivery of the visa). The delivery of residence permits abroad through consulates and, consequently, the abolition of long-term visas for the category of temporary migrants such as students could be considered as one possible option to facilitate their admission in the EU.

Access to labour market

On the discussion of access to labour market for non-EU students and researchers, there are two topics that emerge in the debate. One is allowing access to labour market during research/study period and another issue is allowing access after the period of research or study is over.

With regards to researchers, MPC proposes that they should be allowed to do some accessory paid work in direct relation with their research project during their research period, like writing articles in scientific reviews, giving conferences or consultancy, etc.  For students, during their study period there should be a threshold of up to a minimum of 20 hours per week while no limit should be put during periods of holidays (if the student has made acceptable progress in his/her studies). The rationale is that such accessory work would provide both students and researchers with a significant amount of experience and academic credentials. It is also important to highlight that work during study is an essential source of financial support for many students who do not receive scholarships. Therefore, access to work for students and researchers should be facilitated (exempted of labor market test and even of work permit).

After completion of studies, TCN students and researchers should be allowed to stay in the EU for a limited period of time. For researchers, a temporary extension of one year should be given to enable them to start a new research project, engage in other work or establish a company. Students should be allowed to stay for a maximum of two years after their graduation. Both of these proposals are legitimate as long as the person does not become an unreasonable burden for the social assistance system of the concerned Member State and there is no brain drain problem with the country of origin of the researcher/student.

Intra-EU mobility

Intra-EU mobility has always been a thorny issue for non-EU students and researchers as every EU Member State has different immigration rules concerning it. To facilitate short-term mobility, MPC proposes that a long-term visa delivered to a researcher or student should be valid for the maximum of one year as envisaged by Regulation 265/2010[8], unless the duration of the research or study is shorter (in this case, the long-term visa should be valid for the duration of the research project). This should facilitate the mobility of researchers and students into the EU and towards their country of origin, as the Member States are obliged by the same regulation to replace long-term visas by a residence permit before the visas expire.

The provisions on student mobility could be further improved, by removing the obligation for the student to prove that the studies in the second Member State is a part of or complementary to the studies for which the student has been admitted by the first Member State. The system of the simple declaration instead of a proof (as applied to EU students by Directive 2004/38[9] for the condition of financial resources) could also be applied to the case of the mobility of TCN students.

Finally, the important question that emerges is that for students admitted into one EU Member State, should they be allowed to move and study in another Member State without requiring a new residence permit? Such a possibility already exists for studies of less than three months on the basis of the Schengen acquis[10]. Furthermore, the technique of mutual recognition of residence permits could also be used as long as the residence permit delivered by the first Member State is valid. This would reduce unnecessary hassle and stress for students who would otherwise have to apply for separate residence permits in each Member State. This would also be a clear political sign from the EU that they want to favor the mobility of students.

Other suggestions:

–          Research organisations and universities should be strongly encouraged to appoint liaison officers who would be a contact point for researchers/students and immigration authorities and, when necessary, would inform and assist researchers/students with their immigration procedures.

–         Member States could prepare a leaflet in several languages explaining the facilitations offered to researchers regarding immigration procedures. This leaflet should cover the issue of mobility rights in order to explain clearly their rights and how it works in practice. These leaflets should be made available in consulates and also be sent to the research organisations that Member States have approved under the “Researchers Directive” for dissemination to researchers getting in touch with them.

–          The border between the notions of “PhD students” and “researchers” should be made clear for the users. The criterion is related to the payment of the person: a student is unpaid. Therefore, paid PhD students should be treated as researchers under the “Researchers Directive” (so that they would not need a work permit) as long as they are compensated in money for the work they do for the research organisation. For the rest, it seems difficult to treat unpaid PhD students like researchers because of the risk of abuse of the system.

–          Except for universities based in UK, France and Germany which are widely publicised, there is only limited promotion of other universities from EU Member States. The Commission should make sure that all necessary information about the universities from Member States is accessible through the EU Immigration Portal[11]. In particular, the Commission should check that information about the minimum amount of resources that a TCN should have, is easily accessible.

–          On the basis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU in the case of Commission v. Netherlands of 26 April 2012[12], the Commission should launch without any further delay infringement procedures against Member States requiring disproportionate fees for the delivery of long-term visas or residence permits to students.

In conclusion, the MPC considers that the EU and its Member States should take more care about the treatment of persons that they invite within the purview of EU-financed programmes. Specific procedures involving the Commission and Member States (in particular consulates) should be put in place to make sure that immigration procedures run smoothly and bona fide researchers and students are really treated as welcome guests in the EU. This is essential for a good public image of the EU and would also help in promoting it as an attractive destination for non-EU students and researchers.

Neha Sinha, Policy Analyst to the MPC

Philippe De Bruycker, Deputy Director of the MPC

Acknowledgment: Special thanks to Ashley McCormick, Research Assistant to the MPC, for his kind assistance with the statistical data.

Some Thoughts about the Yearly Report of the European Commission on Immigration and Asylum

The first thing even before reading the 3^rd edition of this report on the year 2011[1] is to remember its origin. It goes back to the Pact on immigration and asylum concluded in 2008 under the French Presidency. The idea was then to have a report about the implementation of this Pact in order to feed the annual debate about migration policies that the European Council was supposed to have at its June meeting.

After 2 editions of the report following the order of the commitments subscribed by the EU and its Member States in the Pact, the 2011 edition changes as announced by the Commission in 2009 in its communication on a tracking method for monitoring the implementation of the pact. But, strange enough, the pact is not even anymore mentioned! Moreover, the report has not been the object of the strategic debate envisaged in the European Council. This tells us something about the (in)coherence of policy-making even at EU level even when it is about the main priorities defined by the Member States themselves. It is probably also one of the consequences of the financial crisis of the Eurozone attracting all the attention of the Heads of State and Government during their meetings.

The report and especially its annex appear to be a long catalogue listing what has been achieved during the past year and what is coming up in the future. One may have the impression that the usefulness of such exercise is limited: the information provided is indeed mainly descriptive and cannot be considered as an evaluation of results. Actually, the report and in particular its long annex based on contributions of the European Migration Network and from the Member States provides to the reader a lot of information that are not (easily) accessible. It nevertheless true that it does not allow to measure the progress of the EU in the development of an immigration and asylum policy; in particular, it does not replace the scoreboard on the implementation of the five-years programme for Justice, Liberty and Security (currently the Stockholm programme) that was compiled about the implementation of the Tampere conclusions and The Hague programme but has mysteriously disappeared, unless it survives secretly as an internal document which would not really be a progress in the field of transparency…

The general tone of the report is a bit unclear. It starts with a frightening introduction where the reader is told that there is an “increasing migratory pressure” plus a “misuse of visa liberalisation” (page2) and continues with a positive statement about the impact of labor migration despite the economic crisis (page 4), a confirmation of the migratory pressures burdening the EU despite the small numbers of migrants quoted to support this statement (page 8), a call for a balanced debate not dominated only by anti-immigration rhetoric (page 17), the denunciation of the image of Fortress Europe as a caricature (page 17) before concluding with putting the emphasis on the roadmap on migratory pressure adopted by the Council in April 2012 (page 18) which actually refers us to the introduction…

The list of what has been achieved shows that 2011 has been a quite productive year as illustrated by the following examples (despite the weaknesses that we will personally underline in brackets).

Among the legislative instruments adopted, one will notice:

• the directive on the single permit and common rights of labor migrants (finally!);
• the amendment of the Frontex regulation of 2004 reinforcing the powers of that European Agency;
• an updated version of the anti-trafficking directive;
• the legal basis for the European Agency for the Operational Management of Large IT Systems in the area of freedom, security and justice;
• the recast of the qualification directive defining the persons who can benefit from international protection in the EU which is the first piece of the Common European Asylum System to be finalised in 2012.

Regarding the legislative package on asylum that is still the object of negotiations between Council and Parliament that are difficult but in progress, one will notice with surprise that the Commission remained silent on the historical decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the MSS case about the malfunctioning of the Dublin system (maybe was it the best option to avoid to underline that an external Court puts order in the EU despite its commitments towards human rights…).

Some tools have been put in place:

•  the Immigration Portal launched on internet;
• the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) that started to function (very) progressively;
• Rabits (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) and Asylum Support Teams designed to help Member States that have been experienced on the ground for the very first time in Greece;
• a new (rather weak) agenda on integration adopted by the Commission.

Regarding the external dimension, one will notice that:

• the VIS (Visa Information System) has been launched for the Northern African region and should reinforce the visa policy and the fight against illegal immigration;
• one more (out of today only 4 in total) mobility partnership has been concluded with Armenia (is this country really a priority one?)
• a Regional Protection Programme has been launched in Northern Africa (let us wait and see where it will lead as the results of the two firsts regional protection programmes are mitigated)

On the side of evaluation:

• the readmission policy has been happily analysed in a very critical way (probably to underline at the attention of the Member States the problems encountered by the Commission during negotiations with third countries);
• the transposition of the directive on long term residents has been the object of a report showing that it had a weak impact with only 2000 persons having acquired this status in France and Germany (true to say that the advantages of this more or less European status are not obvious);
• the pilot study on integration indicators has (finally) been finalised by Eurostat (seven years after the Common Basic principles adopted by the Council underlined their importance…)
• a green paper on family reunification has been launched after long hesitations of the Commission due to the (really difficult) political climate opposed to immigration.

Among the impressive pending initiatives that have been prepared by the Commission in 2011, apart of the proposals for a directive on seasonal migration and intra-corporate transferees that are still under negotiations showing that legal migration remains definitely one of the most difficult issues to deal with Member States still defending in the Council of Ministers the rest of their sovereignty in this area, let us mention:

• the Eurosur proposal related to the fight against illegal immigration in particular through sea;
• the launch of negotiations for mobility partnerships with Tunisia and Morocco but not Egypt (finally the serious business with important Southern third countries of emigration will start) that will be difficult due to the conditionality that the EU and its Member want to impose;
• the proposals for external agreements on the portability of social rights (a very important issue finally taken into consideration)
• the two new funds (one for asylum & migration and the other for internal security including borders) for an envisaged budget of 8,4 billions of Euros during the period 2014-20 instead of 3,9 billions for the four existing funds which is an extremely significant increase (but let us wait and see for the results of the negotiations on the EU budget)

Some future initiatives have also been announced:

• a merge of the two directives on students of 2004 and researchers of 2005 (could students benefit from this joint package with researchers whom have been the object of a really innovative instrument?);
• Smart (for whom?) Borders with two new databases (the Exit/Entry System to increase control on illegal immigration and the Registered Traveler Programme to facilitate the travel of bona fide persons);
• guidelines on temporary permits after the passage of illegal migrants from Tunisia to France with the help of Italy that delivered “humanitarian” residence permits (a weak instrument proposed but a possible interesting step forward in the competences of Member States)
• a green paper on economic migration (that will lead to a very difficult but necessary debate to relaunch the agenda in this field where the last outdated Commission action plan dates of 2005). 

It is also interesting to have a look inside but also outside the report to what has not been (well) done:

• the apparent lack of ambition of Member States in the transposition of the Blue card directive aiming at facilitating the admission of highly skilled workers (as the Member States had to transpose this directive for 2011, let us hope that the Commission will deliver on time that kind of report on 19 June 2014 as foreseen, which is already quite late if it is about putting political pressure on the Member States).
• an evaluation of the Global approach to migration which has been the object of an interesting but curious Communication of the Commission looking forward instead of backwards;
• the field of migration and development presented as a priority but where concrete progress is quite limited since years regarding brain drain, diasporas and remittances, without even speaking of the (indeed very difficult) subject of the recognition of third country degrees hold by migrants. This is actually the only part of the Global approach that has been the object of an evaluation of its results in a staff working document of the Commission[2].

Finally, which lessons can we draw from this report for the future?

Firstly, the Commission underlines rightly that it is necessary to implement the existing instruments before imagining new ones. This advice (that does not really flow from the content of the report but is obviously wise) will nevertheless be difficult to implement if serious progress is not made about the evaluation of the effects of instruments. The EU needs to shift from basic quantitative to real qualitative evaluations by devoting to ex-post evaluations the same attention to ex-ante so called “impact assessments”. Let us hope that the current violent fight engaged by the Parliament against the Council about the Schengen evaluation mechanism will not be only one more inter-institutional battle distracting the attention from the substance of evaluation (also because the Parliament has taken a wrong legal position in that debate).

Secondly, the occasion that the EU has missed towards the Arab countries undergoing revolutions in 2011: instead of showing them consideration in the (indeed difficult) debate on migration and imagining at least to offer them facilitations for the delivery of short term visas in the future, the EU sinked into a debate about the possibility for Member States to reintroduce internal border controls in the Schengen area. This was not only a false debate (the real issue is obviously about the effectiveness of external border controls), but also an internal debate during which we forgot our neighbors. The fact that the Commissioner in charge of Home Affairs admits courageously this historical mistake in her speech at the opening session of the Migration Policy Centre in Florence[3] does not bow out that the Commission obeys nowadays to the Heads of State or Government by preparing a proposal that raises several legal questions of compatibility with the treaties.

This story is unfortunately one more occasion to underline what is cruelly missing in the European Union: solidarity between Member States without which it is impossible to build the common policies on visas, borders, immigration and asylum requested by the Treaty of Lisbon adopted by the same Member States…

 Philippe De Bruycker, Deputy Director of the MPC

The views expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of the Migration Policy Centre.

Mobility Partnerships – what impact do they have on legal migration and mobility?

Mobility Partnerships (MPs) have been promoted as a flagship tool of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration for five years now. They have been signed with Cape Verde, the Republicof Moldova, Georgiaand Armenia– all countries of rather discreet migratory impact on the EU. All the political evaluations to date[1] show that MPs are an effective tool to enhance international cooperation as well as introduce more coherence in the internal governance of migration in the sending country. According to participating governments and the European Commission, the MPs have been critical to get state officials together around one table and force them to think about their migration policies and to cooperate, also on the issues of legal migration and mobility. But what impact do MPs have on legally mobile migrants and migrant workers? On societies? On labour markets?

The expectations for increased mobility have been very high, but they still have not been fulfilled, to the point that in the academic circles this instrument is sarcastically called ‘Immobility Partnerships’. Is the criticism justified? What should we do next with the tool? Can it be saved, and most importantly – should it be?

I. What are we talking about when discussing legal migration and mobility in the EU context?

Legal migration and mobility in the EU policy language, as presented inter alia in the Third Report on Immigration and Asylum (SWD (2012)179 final) is quite a fuzzy concept. It includes such varied phenomena as economic migration, skills recognition, family reunification, integration, and prevention of illegal migration (e.g. awareness raising campaigns, Frontex activities and Schengen governance).

In the Communication on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (COM(2011) 743 final) we read that mobility of third country nationals across the external EU borders applies to several categories of people, all bona fide travellers: e.g. students and researchers rarelly migrate, they are just mobile. Mobility is therefore linked to visa policy and can be interpreted as such. Moreover mobility can be enhanced by policies removing obstacles to movement e.g. institutional obstacles (portability of rights, avoidance of double taxation etc.).

II. Legal migration and mobility in Mobility Partnerships to the date

Until now it is quite clear that MPs have focused only on a few aspects of the European Commission’s concept of legal migration and mobility, namely: prevention of illegal migration and border governance. Less attention has been paid to economic migration, portability of rights or skills recognition. Other issues as family reunification or integration in the destination countries have been largely disregarded. Unfortunately the majority of the EU Member States involved in the MPs have not been generous enough to propose real change under this umbrella; instead, many decided to offer already existing legal migration bilateral schemes as their contribution to legal migration part of MPs.

Apart from the fact that the avenues of legal migration have not been really open[2], the institutional changes helping people to be mobile have not materialized either. First, visa policy has not been used fully in this case. Visa facilitation with Cape Verde, initially almost blocked by the EU Member States in the EU Council, has been signed with considerable delay, because inter alia of tough requirements of the readmission agreement. However a Common Visa Application Centre in Cape Verde is another example of facilitated mobility.[3]

III. What is the future of legal migration and mobility in Mobility Partnerships?

If we want to keep the concept, the partners need to decisively improve the component of legal migration and mobility. To achieve this, partners should focus on one major challenge: the value added. In other words – what makes the partnerships a valuable tool over the existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the area of legal migration and mobility? What will make ordinary people more mobile?

1) Targeted change in the legal order

The clear value added of a Mobility Partnership on the level of aMember State is when this Member State changes its legal order to accommodate a mobility of a national of the partner third country. There are only two examples to date that clearly illustrate this: (1) a Polish initiative opening its labour market to the temporary labour migration from the countries which signed the MP; (2) the German initiative to offer to its long-term residents the possibility of return to home country for extended periods of time (up to 2 years) without losing the residence rights. These are pretty direct and straightforward initiatives that bring more value into the MPs.

Other mobility enhancers have included agreements on portability of rights. The importance of MPs for completing these agreements is less obvious as it is not clear that they would not have taken place hadn’t it been for the MPs. This leads to the next point.

2) Going beyond the bilateral relations

Bilateral relations are clearly the best setting to solve migration management issues.

Due to the division of competences, the EU cannot address the most common requirements which have been put forward by prospective partners: economic migration channels, skills recognition, or integration policy. These are domains of the EU Member States. And thus the Mobility Partnership must be in this case a sum of offers of participating Member States. To the date, all 27 have never signed up for one MP. This is often seen as a weakness of the instrument, but is it really? When a Tunisian official wants economic migration channels to the EU, he surely does not mean sending Tunisians toBulgariaorLatvia, rather toFranceorItaly. Does he need a MP to do this? Certainly not. Of course, one may argue, there is a rationale for including bilateral agreements into the MP – when a bilateral legal migration scheme withFrancewill makeTunisiacooperate with other EU Member States on the issues of illegal migration. However, usually illegal and legal flows tend to end in the same destination.

To give the MPs more value added, the legal migration and mobility should go beyond bilateral relations. Participating Member States should think about multilateral initiatives, which bring a real EU dividend. These can be proposed by two actors: by a group of the cooperating Member States and by the European Commission

3) Legal migration and mobility of Mobility Partnership country nationals – what can the EU Member States do?

One idea would be the creation of partially-open labour markets created between two or more EU Member States, where the nationals of a Mobility Partnership country could find employment in specific sectors (e.g. seasonal workers harvesting different crops throughout the season), and could be jobseekers freely circulating across the borders to this end. The system could be created on the basis of a multilateral treaty between the involved EU member States and the Mobility Partnership country. In addition, these mini-zones would assure that all the rights acquired in different MSs add up and can be taken with the migrant to his/her next EU destination or back home.

Another way of changing the status quo and rewarding the partner country would be to introduce, besides EU preference, a Mobility Partnership preference on the labour market.

4) Legal migration and mobility of Mobility Partnership country nationals –what can the European Commission do?

The EU should bring what it has at hand: mobility understood as visa policy. It has been clearly proposed in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility and this should be supported. Especially visa liberalisation is a highly worthwhile tool creating a real partnership. The experience of Visa Liberalisation Dialogues withMoldovaandUkraineshows how some countries can implement the EU requirements for secure environment and thus cut short the worries about the negative consequences of enhanced mobility.

When visa liberalisation for all is impossible, it should be considered for certain categories of people. Again, one can say that with the development of the EU Registered Traveller Programme the obstacles to mobility will hopefully diminish. However, this solution is devised for all the countries in the world and hence, there needs to be something extra for the MP countries in it.

Another possibility is to follow the already established path for coordination of social security systems between the EU and Associated Countries[4] and offer the same solution to the Mobility Partnership countries, e.g. while testing the proposed EU Social Security Agreements.[5]

IV. Concluding remarks

Mobility Partnerships are still the tools-in-the-making and we need to give them time, as it usually happens in international cooperation. It would be unfair to sentence MPs right now. But it is reasonable to expect that they keep on improving and developing in the right direction with more elements that fulfil their main promise: more mobility to the ordinary people. This includes more of special treatment of the nationals of the partner third countries: more innovative visa facilitation instruments, more visa liberalisation, and more real labour migration.

Agnieszka Weinar, Scientific Coordinator of CARIM East and MIGMEDCIS

The views expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of the Migration Policy Centre.